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Abstract	Studying	twelve	countries	over	30	years,	we	examine	whether	women’s	educational	expansion	has	 translated	 into	 a	 closing	 gender	 earnings	 gap.	 As	 educational	 attainment	 is	 cohort-dependent,	 an	 Age-Period-Cohort	 analysis	 is	 most	 appropriate	 in	 our	 view.	 Using	 the	Luxembourg	Income	Study	(LIS)	data,	we	show	that	while	in	terms	of	attainment	of	tertiary	education	 women	 have	 caught	 up	 and	 often	 even	 outperform	 men,	 substantial	 gender	differences	 in	 earnings	 persist	 in	 all	 countries.	 These	 results	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	composition	 of	 the	 top	 earnings	 decile.	 Using	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 decomposition	 methods,	 we	demonstrate	that	the	role	of	education	in	explaining	the	gender	earnings	gap	has	been	limited	and	even	decreased	over	cohorts.	Contrary,	employment	status	as	well	as	occupation	explain	a	more	substantial	part	in	all	countries.	We	conclude	that	earnings	differences	at	levels	far	from	gender	equality	likely	also	persist	in	the	future,	even	if	the	“rise	of	women”	in	terms	of	education	continues.		
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The	persistence	of	the	gender	earnings	gap:	Cohort	trends	and	the	role	of	education	in	twelve	countries		1.	 Introduction	In	many	developed	countries,	female	cohorts	have	successively	outperformed	male	cohorts	in	terms	of	tertiary	education.	On	average,	and	in	contrast	with	earlier	birth	cohorts,	women	are	today	more	likely	to	have	a	degree	from	tertiary	education	than	men	(Mare	1995;	DiPrete	and	Buchman	2013;	Becker,	Hubbard	and	Murphy	2010;	Breen	et	al.	2010;	Buchmann	and	DiPrete	2006;	Grant	and	Behrman	2010;	Wilson,	Zozula	and	Gove	2011).	With	respect	to	educational	attainment,	the	glass	ceiling	has	been	broken.	However,	does	this	increase	in	tertiary	degrees	translate	 into	 commensurate	 female	 earnings?	 Education	 is	 the	 main	 determinant	 of	 one’s	occupational	outcomes	and	progress	(Treiman	and	Terrell	1975).	Moreover,	educated	women	have	higher	employment	levels	and	shorter	career	interruptions	compared	with	less	educated	women	(Steiber	and	Haas	2012).	Therefore,	an	expansion	in	women’s	education	should	close	or	at	least	narrow	the	gender	earnings	gap.		Does	the	“rise	of	women”,	i.e.	their	catching	up	with	men	in	terms	of	educational	attainment,	indeed	 coincide	 with	 a	 narrowing	 gender	 earnings	 gap?	 Some	 studies	 indeed	 document	 a	narrowing	of	the	gender	gap	in	terms	of	hourly	earnings;	but	they	also	show	a	slowing	down	of	this	trend	(Bernhardt,	Morris	and	Handcock	1995;	Blau,	Brinton,	and	Grusky	2008;	England,	Gornick	and	Shafer	2012;	Fitzenberger	and	Wunderlich	2002;	Fransen,	Plantenga	and	Vlasblom	2010;	Bailey	and	Diprete	2016).	Consequently,	significant	gaps	remain.	Apparently,	educational	parity	is	a	necessary,	but	not	sufficient,	condition	for	closing	the	gender	earnings	gap.		How	can	these	two	opposing	trends,	educational	parity	and	persisting	gender	gap	in	earnings,	be	reconciled?	First,	many	scholars	agree	that	steady	gender	segregation	is	a	major	reason	that	gender	earnings	and	 income	gaps	do	not	converge	to	zero	(Bielby	and	Baron	1986,	Preston	1999,	Olsen	et	al.	2010).	Recent	studies	show	that	education	explains	only	a	relatively	small	part	of	the	gender	earnings	gap	compared	to	occupation	and	industry	(Blau	and	Kahn	2016).	Second,	and	this	is	the	focus	of	our	study,	educational	attainment	may	still	have	played	a	role	in	explaining	 gender	 differences	 before,	 i.e.	 in	 times	 where	 educational	 differences	 between	women	and	men	were	 large.	Hence,	an	explanation	may	be	that	only	the	part	of	 the	gender	
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earnings	gap	explained	by	education	has	shrunk	over	time.	Yet,	these	two	developments	have	not	been	investigated	jointly.		The	objective	of	our	paper	is	therefore	to	assess	the	effects	of	variation	in	the	gender	education	gap	–	across	countries	and	cohorts	–	on	variation	in	the	overall	gender	earnings	gap.	To	this	end,	we	investigate	unadjusted	gender	earnings	gaps	but	moreover	also	assess	gender	earnings	gaps	net	of	some	important	covariates.		However,	we	neither	aspire	to	decompose	the	gender	earnings	gap	(across	countries	and	cohorts)	into	all	of	its	micro-level	components,	nor	do	we	aim	to	identify	the	(residual)	“discrimination”	component.	This	has	been	done	elsewhere	with	more	refined	data.	The	strength	of	our	data,	the	Luxembourg	Income	Study,	is	the	opportunity	to	 investigate	 large	 number	 of	 countries	 over	many	 decades	 and	 thus	 cohorts.	 Rather	 than	providing	institutional	explanations,	we	focus	here	on	the	variation	in	the	trends	of	the	gender	earnings	gap	across	countries.	In	our	view,	a	cohort-based	analysis	is	most	suitable	to	study	trends	in	the	gender	earnings	gap,	because	educational	attainment	is	known	to	be	cohort	sensitive	(Chauvel	2004).	In	addition,	it	is	 important	 to	 use	 an	 age	 period	 cohort	 (APC)	 analysis	 to	 control	 for	 period	 (e.g.,	 policy	reforms)	or	age	effects	(e.g.,	motherhood)	that	only	accrue	in	a	certain	period	or	at	a	certain	age.	Cohort	analysis	allows	us	to	identify	cohort	replacement	mechanisms	and	predict	future	trends	more	accurately,	net	of	compositional	effects.	If	younger,	more	egalitarian	cohorts	are	small	in	size	relative	to	older	ones,	an	overall	slowing	down	of	the	declining	gender	earnings	gap	may	be	observed,	although	the	cohort	effects	point	towards	a	continuation	of	this	process	as	younger	 cohorts	 replace	older	 cohorts.	Existing	 studies	have	 shown	 that	 countries	differ	considerably	in	the	gender	gap	in	earnings	(Harkness	2010;	England.	Gornick	and	Shafer	2012;	Mandel	2012;	Christofides,	Polycarpou,	and	Vrachimis	2013).	We	argue	that	the	timing	of	the	catch-up	of	women	in	terms	of	educational	attainment	is	relevant	to	understanding	why	women	have	caught	up	more	in	terms	of	earnings	in	some	countries,	but	not	in	others.		APC	studies	analysing	the	gender	earnings	gap	are	rare	because	long	and	coherent	time	series	data	are	required.	The	few	existing	studies	confirm	strong	cohort	effects	in	the	gender	earnings	gap	(Campbell	and	Pearlman	2013).	No	cross-national	cohort	study	decomposing	the	gender	earnings	gap	 into	different	 factors	exists	 to	date.	This	 study	contributes	 to	 the	 literature	by	adding	 a	 comparative	 cohort	 study	 of	 twelve	 countries	 spanning	 over	 25	 years,	 which	decomposes	 the	 gender	 earnings	 gap	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 the	 role	 of	 the	 level	 of	 education	completed.	It	uses	the	Luxembourg	Income	Study	(LIS)	Database	–	a	recognized	cross-national	dataset	 where	 earnings,	 incomes	 and	 the	 highest	 attained	 degree	 of	 education	 are	systematically	harmonized,	making	it	possible	to	analyse	a	large	set	of	countries	over	several	
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decades.	A	methodological	contribution	of	this	study	is	moreover	the	novel	approach	applying	Blinder-Oaxaca	decomposition	methods	in	the	framework	of	a	new	APC	analysis	and	providing	this	tool	to	the	research	community	(Chauvel,	Hartung	and	Bar	Haim	2017).	A	merit	of	our	study	is	its	inclusiveness	with	respect	to	the	part	of	the	society	we	study.	We	look	at	the	annual	labour	income	(earnings)	of	all	persons	and	thus	also	include	persons	with	zero	earnings	and	those	in	part-time	employment	in	addition	to	those	in	full-time	employment.	Our	“gender	 earnings	 gap”	 is	 thus	 a	 composite	 measure,	 conflating	 gender	 earnings	 gaps	 in	employment	rates,	in	hours	worked	among	the	employed,	and	in	earnings	per	hour	worked.	We	understand	 that	 this	 is	 an	 unusual	 way	 to	 conceptualize	 gender	 gaps	 in	 earnings	 but	 this	measure	 has	 a	 few	 clear	 advantages	 (Gornick	 1999).	 The	 distinction	 between	 different	components	of	gender	disparities	into	(a)	allocative	 inequalities	(i.e.	 in	hiring	practices),	 (b)	within-job	pay	gap	and	(c)	in	the	form	of	valuative	discrimination	(e.g.	Petersen	and	Saporta	2004)	 makes	 these	 advantages	 clearer.	 Most	 studies	 have	 investigated	 the	 second	 type	 of	inequalities,	 comparing	 like	 with	 like.	 Looking	 only	 at	 (full-time)	 employed	 women,	 they	exclude	a	very	large	part	of	the	female	population	(Gornick	1999).	The	majority	of	the	literature	that	analyses	the	gender	gap	in	earnings:	(i)	exclude	non-earners,	and	(ii)	among	the	employed,	control	for	hours	(using	continuous	data	or	the	binary	distinction	of	part-time	versus	full-time)	or	 they	 restrict	 their	samples	to	 the	 full-time	employed.	This	approach	may	offer	precision,	however,	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 exclusion.	 Put	 differently,	 such	 selections	 or	 samples	 may	 be	representative	 for	 full-time	 employed	women	but	 they	 are	 also	 very	 far	 from	 representing	women’s	relative	position	in	the	society	overall.	In	the	Netherlands,	Switzerland,	Australia,	the	UK,	 Japan,	 Germany,	 Ireland,	 and	 Austria	 for	 instance,	 less	 than	 two	 thirds	 of	 all	 women	employed	were	full-time	employed	in	2016;	in	the	Netherlands	only	about	40%	(OECD	2018a).	However,	 if	 we	 consider	 the	 employment	 rate	 simultaneously,	 which	 again	 reduces	 the	observed	population	by	a	substantial	part,	in	21	out	of	38	OECD	countries,	full-time	employed	women	represent	fewer	than	half	of	working	aged	women	(own	calculations	based	on	OECD	2018a	and	2018b).		A	second	merit	of	our	measure	 is	 its	multi-dimensionality	and	comprehensiveness	(Gornick	1999).	We	are	to	account	for	other	economic	inequalities	between	women	and	men,	such	as	those	resulting	from	task	division,	joint	household	decisions	and	labour	market	discrimination,	etc.	 Our	measure	 comprises	 differentials	 in	 initial	 positions	 and	wages	 as	well	 as	 over	 the	career,	promotions,	the	glass	ceiling,	and	departures	(cf.	Petersen	and	Saporta	2004).	It	is	thus	able	to	capture	women’s	overall	penetration	into	the	labour	market	(relative	to	men’s),	which	arguably	correlates	with	women’s	status	and	power	in	society	(Gornick	1999).		
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Third	and	related,	both	of	these	aspects	are	leading	to	a	third	merit,	namely	to	better	reflect	women’s	relative	position	in	comparisons	over	time	and	across	countries.	In	some	countries	or	period,	societal	and	labour	market	changes	may	only	be	visible	in	some	of	these	dimensions	and	 by	 the	 same	 token	 only	 a	 comprehensive	measure	 is	 able	 to	 account	 for	 the	 diverging	trends.		2.	 Explaining	the	gender	earnings	gap	
The	total	gender	earnings	gap	can	be	understood	as	an	accumulation	of	 three	main	types	of	gender	differences	and	inequalities:	(i)	differences	in	employment	chances,	(ii)	in	numbers	of	hours	worked	and	(iii)	earnings	per	hour	(compare	also	Petersen	and	Saporta	2004).	(In	each	of	 these	dimensions,	different	 factors	are	at	play,	 to	which	we	turn	below.)	A	 first	source	of	inequality	 in	 the	 labour	market	 concerns	 employment	 chances.	 It	 is	 a	well-known	 fact	 that	women	are	in	many	countries	still	far	behind	men	in	terms	of	labour	market	participation	as	well	as	employment	rates.	Lower	female	employment	means	more	women	without	earnings	and	thus	a	greater	gender	earnings	gap.	Inequalities	conditional	on	employment	that	typically	arise	between	women	and	men	are	the	number	of	hours	worked	as	well	as	the	earnings	per	hour.	Women	are	more	often	part-time	employed	than	men	and	thus	have	lower	total	earnings.	Finally,	women	earn	still	less	per	hour	in	the	same	positions	as	many	studies	show.		There	 is	 a	 vast	 literature	 on	 the	 micro-	 and	 macro	 factors	 driving	 each	 of	 these	 three	components	of	the	gender	earnings	gap.	Some	of	them	stem	from	differences1	between	women	and	men;	some	are	the	result	of	differential	treatment.		2.1	The	rise	of	women:	The	declining	gender	gap	in	educational	attainment	The	closing	or	even	reversal	of	the	gender	gap	in	education,	or	“the	rise	of	women”	–	the	title	of	the	seminal	book	by	DiPrete	and	Buchmann	(2013)	–	has	occurred	in	most	western	countries	over	a	similar	time	frame	(Breen	et	al.	2010),	mainly	during	the	phase	of	educational	expansion.	The	expansion	of	educational	systems	has	been	attributed	to	a	variety	of	economic,	sociological	and	 cultural	 reasons.	 National	 governments	 expand	 educational	 systems	 as	 a	 response	 to	market	demand.	They	believe	that	it	enhances	the	productivity	of	the	work	force	and	increases	economic	growth	(e.g.	Schultz	1961).	Technological	developments	raise	employer	demand	for	educated	 workers,	 which	 in	 turn	 boosts	 the	 economic	 returns	 to	 education.	 Families	 and	students	 respond	 to	 these	 changes	 by	 investing	more	 time	 and	 resources	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	
                                               
1 We	do	not	assume	that	all	gender	differences	are	disadvantages	–	they	may	also	reflect	preferences. 
  6 
(higher)	 education	 (Becker	 1964).	 Over	 time,	 the	 economy	 shifts	 towards	 occupations	 that	require	 complex	 skills	 (Acemoglu	 2002).	 As	 the	 skill	 intensity	 of	 the	 economy	 grows,	recruitment	of	 labour	 is	 increasingly	reliant	on	educational	credentials	(Bound	and	Johnson	1992).	Educational	systems	also	expand	as	part	of	the	institutional	diffusion	process,	by	which	peripheral	 countries	 in	 the	 world	 system	 tend	 to	 emulate	 institutional	 forms	 prevalent	 in	esteemed	core	nations	(Meyer,	Ramirez	and	Soysal	1992;	Schofer	and	Meyer	2005).			The	gender	gaps	in	the	three	above	mentioned	components	are	strongly	linked	to	the	level	of	education	especially	in	employment	and	hourly	pay:	women	with	higher	degrees	are	typically	more	 often	 employed,	 work	 more	 hours	 and	 show	 a	 smaller	 gender	 gap	 in	 hourly	 pay.	Educational	expansion	has	equipped	women	with	higher	diplomas	and	degrees,	which	should	eradicate	one	reason	for	the	“legitimate	part”	of	the	gender	earnings	gap.	In	addition,	women	show	increasing	participation	in	higher	education	(the	“rise	of	women”)	and	the	labour	market.	Due	to	the	increase	in	educational	attainment,	women	were	moreover	able	to	move	up	in	the	occupational	hierarchy.	While	many	women	used	to	hold	clerical	 jobs	 in	 the	past,	more	and	more	women	can	be	found	in	top	positions,	e.g.	managerial	jobs.		Contrary	to	the	gender	trends	in	education,	recent	studies	suggest	that,	at	least	for	the	US,	the	narrowing	of	 the	gender	earnings	gap	has	slowed	down	and	stalled	at	 levels	 far	 from	parity	(Blau	and	Kahn	2007,	Campbell	and	Pearlman	2013).	Furthermore,	Boockmann	and	Steiner	(2006)	have	shown	that	the	returns	to	education	decline	among	women	but	not	among	men.	This	 is	 surprising,	 because	 education	 differentials	 are	 commonly	 adduced	 as	 an	 important	reason	for	earnings	gaps;	for	example,	over	racial,	ethnic	and	migration	lines	(Black	et	al.	2006;	Mandel	and	Semyonov	2016).		Recent	studies	on	the	US,	moreover,	suggest	that	gender	differences	in	education	and	human	capital	 (and	 thus	 presumably	 productivity)	 do	 not	 explain	 but	 a	minor	 part	 of	 the	 gender	earnings	gap	today	(Blau	and	Kahn	2016).	In	the	past,	however,	their	role	was	more	important,	when	the	gender	differences	in	formal	education,	as	well	as	in	years	of	work	experience,	in	job	tenure,	in	fields	of	study,	in	engagement	in	on-the-job	training,	etc.,	were	larger.	Our	hypothesis	is	 therefore	 that	 the	 role	 of	 education	 in	 explaining	 the	 gender	 gap	 has	 decreased	 in	 all	countries.		As	our	main	aim	in	this	paper	is	to	estimate	the	role	of	the	educational	gender	gap	as	one	driver	of	the	gender	earnings	gap,	we	test	the	following	hypotheses:	
H1:	 The	 gender	 gap	 in	 educational	 attainment	 has	 declined	 over	 birth	 cohorts	 and	 has	 been	
reversed	among	the	most	recent	cohorts.	
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H2:	The	gender	gap	in	earnings	has	declined	over	birth	cohorts.	
H3:	 As	 the	 gender	 gap	 in	 educational	 attainment	 has	 continued	 to	 close,	 its	 role	 as	 a	 factor	
explaining	the	gender	earnings	gap	has	declined	across	cohorts/with	educational	expansion.	Simultaneously,	changes	in	the	occupational	structure	might	have	affected	the	relative	ability	of	women	to	translate	their	new	educational	advantage	into	returns.	Therefore,	we	next	turn	to	the	nexus	between	education	and	occupational	structure.		2.2	Education,	occupational	segregation	and	occupational	transformation	Also	 preferences	 of	women	 -either	 for	 employment,	 particular	 job	 types	 or	 flexibility-	may	explain	the	gender	gap.	But	the	mechanism	is	subtler	than	this	simplified	explanation	suggests.	Goldin	 (2014)	 for	 instance	 suggests	 that	women	disproportionately	pursue	 jobs	 compatible	with	family	responsibilities,	which	have	lower	earnings	per	hour.	Gender	roles,	norms	and	the	culture	of	a	society	may	lead	women	to	these	choices;	or	they	may	even	cause	entry	barriers	for	women,	 e.g.	 the	 labour	 division	 between	 women	 and	 men,	 or	 the	 male	 dominance	 of	 an	occupation.	 In	 any	 case,	 the	 outcome	 is	 that	women	 and	men	do	 different	work:	 they	 hold	different	jobs,	work	in	different	occupations,	and	in	different	industries.	Blau	and	Kahn	(2016)	find	that	difference	in	the	type	of	work	account	for	about	half	of	the	gender	pay	gap	in	the	US	in	2010,	more	than	in	1980.		Occupational	gender	segregation	in	particular	is	believed	to	be	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	the	gender	earnings	gap	(Bielby	and	Baron	1986,	Preston	1999,	Olsen	et	al.	2010).	Women	tend	to	concentrate	in	middle-status	occupations,	from	non-manual	to	lower	service	class	occupations,	while	men	tend	to	concentrate	in	both	low-level	manual	occupations	and	high-level	managerial	positions	(Jacobs	1989).	Due	to	educational	expansion	and	skill	biased	technological	change	(SBTC),	the	occupational	structure	of	the	labour	market	has	changed	during	the	recent	decades,	which	 should	 have	 a	 differential	 impact	 on	 women	 and	 men	 (Häusermann,	 Kurer	 and	Schwander	2014).	A	number	of	authors	claim	that	these	changes	led	to	a	decline	in	real	wages	of	low-skilled	workers	as	well	as	to	an	increase	in	employment	of	high-skilled	workers	and	to	a	 decrease	 in	 employment	 of	 middle	 occupations	 (Card	 and	 DiNardo	 2002;	 Hijzen	 2007;	Acemoglu	and	Autor	2010).	These	changes	are	particularly	important	for	changes	in	the	gender	earnings	gap,	since	the	labour	market	is	partially	segregated	into	female	and	male	occupations.	Due	 to	 structural	 boundaries	 (Preston	 1999),	 self-selection	 (Carlsson	 2011)	 and	 informal	discrimination	(Bielby	and	Baron	1986,	Goldin	2002),	a	great	number	of	occupations	are	held	mainly	by	either	men	or	women.	Therefore,	changes	at	both	ends	of	the	occupational	structure	should	impact	men	much	more	than	women.		
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These	changes	can	either	reinforce	or	impair	the	gender-equalizing	trend	in	terms	of	earnings.	The	 strongest	 gender-equalizing	 trend	 in	 the	US	 has	 occurred	 among	 the	 lowest	 educated,	which	 can	 in	part	be	attributed	 to	 the	disappearance	of	 relatively	well-paid,	 typically	male-occupied	jobs	in	manufacturing,	while	the	gender	earnings	gap	at	the	top	of	the	occupational	hierarchy	 remains	 the	widest	 pointing	 towards	 a	 “glass	 ceiling”.	 This	 is	 similar	 in	 Europe,	although	there	is	also	some	evidence	for	a	“sticky	floor”,	i.e.	a	widening	wage	gap	at	the	bottom	of	the	wage	distribution	(Arulampalam,	Booth	and	Bryan	2007).	Briefly,	we	expect:	
H4:	 The	 gender	 earnings	 gap	 has	 declined	 faster	 among	 those	 who	 attained	 lower	 levels	 of	
education	than	among	those	who	completed	tertiary	education.		2.3	Other	explanations	for	the	gender	earnings	gap	Our	overview	of	 sources	of	 gender	differences	 in	earnings	 is	not	exhaustive.	There	are	also	other	mechanisms	at	work	(for	an	excellent	review	see	Blau	and	Winkler	2017).	There	is,	first,	ample	evidence	for	different	forms	of	allocative	and	pay	discrimination,	e.g.	old-fashioned	or	statistical	gender	discrimination,	but	also	discrimination	against	parents,	caregivers,	and	part-time	workers	-	all	of	which	disproportionately	penalize	women	(e.g.	Petersen	and	Saporta	2004,	Bardasi	 and	 Gornick	 2008,	 Fang	 and	 Moro	 2011).	 Blau	 and	 Kahn	 (2016)	 suggest	 that	discrimination	may	account	for	as	much	as	38	percent	of	the	gender	pay	gap.	Different	authors	(Levanon,	England	and	Allison	2009,	Petersen	and	Saporta	2004)	argue	that	women’s	work	is	valuated	 less	 than	men’s.	 Using	 US	 Census	 data	 from	 1950	 to	 2000,	 Levanon,	 England	 and	Allison	 (2009)	 find	 that	when	 women’s	 share	 in	 an	 occupation	 increased	 substantially,	 its	average	pay	decreased.	Employers	pay	women	 less	 than	men	 for	 the	 same	 job,	 the	authors	explain.	This	also	decreases	the	average	in	that	field,	the	more	women	enter.	Discrimination,	however,	 is	 likely	 to	 even	 play	 a	 larger	 role	 for	 the	 gender	 earnings	 gap,	 for	 instance	 by	discouraging	 women	 from	 aiming	 for	 well-paid,	 male-dominated	 jobs	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 In	addition,	women	are	paid	less	than	men	for	very	similar	work,	as	the	substantial	pay	difference	between	maids	and	janitors	illustrates.	This	form	of	gender	discrimination	has	been	labelled	as	valuative	discrimination	(Petersen	and	Saporta	2004).		Second,	also	psychological	or	noncognitive	skills	may	account	for	parts	of	the	gender	earnings	gap	but	they	play	only	a	small	to	moderate	role,	and	especially	in	view	of	the	role	occupation	and	industry	effects	(Blau	and	Kahn	2016).	Third,	there	may,	arguably,	be	gender	gaps	in	soft	skills,	i.e.,	the	types	of	productivity-related	attributes	but	these	are	very	difficult	to	measure.		Third,	it	is	widely	acknowledged	that	institutions	shape	gender	inequalities	(Lewis	and	Ostner	1991,	Langan	and	Ostner	1991,	Lewis	1992,	Gornick	et	al.	1997,	Esping-Andersen	2002,	Olivetti	
  9 
and	 Petrongolo	 2017).	 As	 classic	 welfare	 state	 typologies	 (Esping-Andersen	 1990,	 Ferrera	1996)	do	not	sufficiently	incorporate	the	gender	inequality	dimension,	a	number	of	scholars	developed	-or	adapted	these	to-	gender	policy	regimes	(Lewis	and	Ostner	1991,	Langan	and	Ostner	 1991,	 Sainsbury	 1999,	 Gornick	 and	 Meyers	 2006).	 Although	 several	 authors	differentiate	the	realm	of	gender	regimes	further,	there	are	two	main,	opposing	regimes.	The	male	breadwinner	regime	exhibits	a	gender	ideology	of	male	privilege	and	a	gendered	division	of	 labour.	 Women’s	 social	 rights	 are	 derived	 from	 men’s	 entitlements,	 while	 they	 are	responsible	for	care	of	children,	the	sick,	and	the	elderly	through	unpaid	work.	Conversely,	the	dual-earner/dual-carer	(or	earner-carer)	regime	is	characterised	by	equally	shared	roles	and	obligations,	and	thus	by	equal	rights.	The	state	provides	or	remunerates	large	parts	of	the	care	services	leading	to	higher	employment	among	both	genders.	These	typologies	are	compelling	tools	for	cross-national	comparisons	analysis	in	general,	but	-we	believe-	less	suited	for	cohort	analysis	of	long-term	transformations	due	to	their	inability	to	capture	the	complex	historical	trajectories	of	economic	and	political	conditions	that	have	distinct	impacts	on	different	cohorts.	In	this	matter,	we	observe	that	countries	from	the	same	welfare	regime	can	experience	very	divergent	paths:	institutional	proximities	do	not	necessarily	mean	similarity	in	trends	of	social	change.			3.	 Method	3.1	The	Age	Period	Cohort	Gap/Oaxaca	model	(APC-GO)	The	purpose	of	the	Age-Period-Cohort	Gap/Oaxaca	model	(APC-GO2,	Chauvel,	Hartung	and	Bar-Haim	2017)	is	–	see	in	particular	Smith	(2008)	–	to	measure	the	change	across	birth	cohorts	in	the	gap	in	a	dependent	variable	y	(e.g.,	earnings)	between	two	groups	(e.g.,	gender).		Data	fitted	to	APC-GO	are	structured	as	a	Lexis	table,	i.e.	an	age	by	period	table	of	(cross-sectional)	data	with	a	constant	pace	in	age	and	in	period	(e.g.,	five-year	age	groups	measured	each	fifth	year).	Each	cell	of	the	Lexis	table	is	indexed	by	its	age	a	and	a	period	p	and	then	pertain	to	cohorts	c	=	
p	-	a.	Then,	we	apply	a	two-step	method:		
• First,	we	 compute	 a	matrix	uapc	 of	 (un)explained	and	 total	 differences	 on	 a	 base	 of	 Oaxaca-Blinder	models	of	y	including	relevant	control	variables	run	for	each	(age	by	period)	cell	of	the	initial	Lexis	table	yapc	and	obtain	the	Oaxaca	Lexis	table	of	the	gender	earnings	gap.		
                                               2	The	APC-GO	ado	file	for	Stata	can	be	downloaded	via	the	command	ssc	install	apcgo.	
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• To	this	Oaxaca	Lexis	table,	we	apply,	second,	a	specific	trended	APC	model	in	order	to	obtain	the	trend	measure	of	the	cohort-specific	earnings	gap,	the	APCT-lag	coefficient.	The	complete	APC-GO	method	cannot	provide	direct	estimations	for	confidence	intervals	due	to	its	complexity;	i.e.	succession	of	Blinder-Oaxaca	and	APC	methods.	Therefore,	we	bootstrap	the	entire	process	considered,	including	first	the	Oaxaca-Blinder	decomposition	of	each	cell	of	the	initial	Lexis	table	of	yapc	to	obtain	the	non-explained	oapc	Oaxaca	Lexis	table.		
Step	1:	Oaxaca	Lexis	table	In	 order	 to	 obtain	 the	 gender	 gaps	 in	 earnings	 (un-)explained	 by	 education	 and	 other	characteristics,	 we	 apply	 the	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 decomposition	method	 (Blinder	 1973;	 Oaxaca	1973;	Jann	2008)	to	each	cell	of	the	initial	Lexis	table.	Since	the	mean	of	the	residuals	are	equal	to	zero,	we	can	express	the	average	earnings	of	men	and	women	as	products	of	the	coefficients	obtained	from	the	two	regressions	and	their	mean	covariates,	as	presented	in	equations	(1)	and	(2):	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1)		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2)	Where	 represents	the	mean	of	the	covariate	X	at	cohort	C	for	men	and	 represents	the	coefficient	 for	 the	mentioned	 covariate,	 at	 the	 same	 cohort	 for	men.	 Similarly,	 	 and	 	represent	the	mean	of	the	covariate	X	and	the	coefficient	for	women	at	cohort	C.	By	 subtracting	 (1)	and	 (2),	we	can	express	 the	differences	 in	 returns	 to	education	 for	each	cohort:			 		 	 	 (3)	where	the	term	 is	the	overall	earnings	gap	in	cohort	C,	 is	the	gap	explained	by	covariate	X	in	cohort	C	and	the	term	 	is	the	unexplained	part.	The	unexplained	part	comprises	the	effect	of	variables	not	observed	in	our	model,	which	we	call	uapc.		
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Step	2:	APCT-lag	of	the	Oaxaca	Lexis	table	In	the	second	step,	we	develop	a	cohort-indexed	measure	of	the	gaps	in	the	Oaxaca	Lexis	table.	This	step	relies	on	an	adaptation	called	the	APCTL	(“Lag”)	of	the	APCT	(“Trended”)	(Chauvel	and	Schröder	2015)	model,	that	had	been	designed	to	detect	cohort	change	in	level	of	living	in	the	context	of	different	welfare	regimes.	The	APCT	is	itself	a	cohort-trended	variation	of	the	more	standard	APCD	(“Detrended”)	model	(Chauvel	2013;	Chauvel	et	al.	2016),	which	we	fully	describe	 below	 in	 Appendix	 A.	 Based	 on	 this	 model,	 the	 new	 APCT-lag	 approach	 that	 is	distinctive	from	previous	approaches	in	its	constraints,	designed	to	have	a	realistic	linear	trend	of	 the	 age	 component3	 implying	 a	 robust	 identification	 of	 the	 cohort	 dynamics.	 It	 is	widely	acknowledged	that	appropriate	constraints	are	necessary	to	solve	the	identification	problem	of	the	 linear	 combination	of	 age,	 period	 and	 cohort	 effects,	which	 is	 an	 inherent	 issue	 of	 APC	models	(see	appendix	A).	In	the	APCD	model,	constraints	are	designed	to	robustly	estimate	the	cohort	 deviation	 to	 the	 zero-slope	 (i.e.	 “fluctuations”),	 to	 identify	 how	 specific	 cohorts	 can	significantly	deviate	from	the	linear	trend:	 	 	 	 (4)	where	the	sums	and	trends	of	each	set	of	coefficients	 are	constrained	to	zero;	 	and		absorb	the	age	and	the	cohort	trend	respectively	the	establishment	of	specific	baselines	for	comparisons	of	models.	 Some	constraints	provide	easy-to-understand	baselines	 such	as	 the	APCD,	which	have	a	baseline	of	zero	linear	trend	in	cohort	(see	Appendix	A).	We	propose	here	a	 new	 APC	model,	 the	 APCT-lag,	 proposing	 an	 empirically	 relevant	 baseline	 to	 understand	cohort	trends.	We	constrain	the	estimated	linear	component	of	the	age	effect	 a to	equate	the	observed	average	age	shift	of	cohorts	 in	 the	observed	Lexis	 table	oapc.	Consider	this	average	shift a:		
        (5) 
where  represents	the	average	shift	for	a	cohort	c	when	it	becomes	one	age	group	older	in	the	next	 period	 across	 the	 window	 of	 observation	 of	 a	 age	 groups	 and	 p	 periods.	 Once	 this	constraint	is	implemented	(a	is	known)	and	the	linear	trend	of	period	is	constrained	to	zero,	the	 cohort	 effect	 will	 absorb	 the	 long-term	 time	 transformations	 and	 the	 APCT-lag	 is	identifiable:	 			 	 	 	 	 (APCT-lag)	 	 (6)	
                                               3	“Realistic”	because	it	equates	the	age	trend	lag	we	observe	on	the	window	of	observation.	
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with	 .	We	calculate	the	formula	of	the	operator	Trend	for	age	coefficients,	where	A	is	the	number	of	age	coefficients,	as	follows:			 	 	 	 	 	 	 (7)	
In	the	APCT-lag,	 	absorbs	the	constant	(larger	when	the	gap	is	high);	its	average	linear	trend	shows	the	variation	in	the	intensity	of	the	controlled	gap	and	the	fluctuations	show	possible	non-linear	accelerations	or	deceleration	in	the	cohort	trend.		3.2	Data	and	variables	Using	data	from	the	Luxembourg	Income	Study	(LIS)	Database,	we	include	the	following	twelve	countries	for	which	we	have	sufficient	information	on	education	and	cohorts:	Germany	(DE),	Denmark	(DK),	Spain	(ES),	Finland	(FI),	France	(FR),	Israel	(IL),	Italy	(IT),	Luxembourg	(LU),	the	Netherlands	(NL),	Norway	(NO),	the	United	Kingdom	(UK)	and	the	United	States	(US).		We	divide	our	cross-sectional	data	into	approximately	five-year	periods	between	1985	and	2010,	and	construct	five-year	birth	cohorts	between	1935	and	1980,	restricting	age	to	25–59	years	to	focus	 on	 the	 primary	 years	 of	 earning	 (i.e.,	 after	 the	 completion	 of	 schooling	 and	 before	retirement	and/or	increased	disability).	Descriptive	statistics	of	our	sample	are	provided	in	the	supplementary	material	S2.	Our	 dependent	 variable	 is	 earnings	 (or	 personal	 labour	 income,	 LIS	 variable	 PIL),	 which	includes	paid	employment	income	(basic	wages,	wage	supplements,	directors’	wages,	casually	paid	employment	income),	and	self-employment	income.	These	are,	in	other	words,	monetary	payments	 and	 value	 of	 non-monetary	 goods	 and	 services	 received	 from	 dependent	employment	as	well	as	profits	or	 losses	and	value	of	goods	 for	own	consumption	 from	self-employment.4		Then	we	apply	the	 logit-rank	transformation	as	proposed	by	Chauvel	(2016),	which	offers	a	standardization	 strategy	 consistent	 with	 the	 Pareto	 characteristics	 of	 income	 distributions	(ibidem).	 More	 importantly,	 it	 allows	 us	 to	 include	 zero	 earnings.	 This	 is	 a	 substantial	contribution	relative	to	previous	studies	as	the	focus	on	hourly	wages	omits	those	parts	of	the	population	with	no	labour	market	participation	or	zero	earnings	and	thus	underestimates	the	real	gender	gap	(Blau	and	Kahn	2013).		
                                               4	Due	to	the	gender	gap	in	self-employment	and	for	robustness,	we	repeat	the	variable	pile,	which	excludes	income	sources	from	self-employment.	The	output	is	presented	in	the	supplementary	material.	
cg
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We	 proceed	 as	 follows.	 Let	 pÎ[0;1]	 be	 the	 percentile	 rank	 of	 individual	 i	 in	 the	 income	distribution,	so	that	the	logged	odds	of	the	percentile	 	measure	the	relative	social	power	of	individual	i	(Copas	1999,	compare	also	the	Positional	Status	Index	in	Rotman	et	al.	2016).	 Using	 the	 so-created	 rank	 positions	 enables	 us	 to	 look	 at	 changes	 in	 the	 earnings	structure	net	of	the	Gini	(Chauvel	2016).	We	use	the	logit-rank	of	earnings	as	the	dependent	variable	in	our	APC-GO	model.		When	analysing	the	gender	earnings	gap	we	proceed	in	three	steps:	first	we	display	the	overall,	uncontrolled	gap	in	earnings.	In	a	second	step,	we	introduce	education	to	investigate	to	what	degree	the	gender	gap	in	educational	attainment	is	able	to	explain	the	gender	gap	in	earnings.	Third,	we	include	also	household	characteristics	(living	with	a	partner,	number	of	children5),	employment	status6,	and	occupation	(with	the	exception	of	Italy	and	Norway,	where	consistent	occupational	 information	 is	not	available).	This	 strategy	allows	us	 to	explain	 the	gap	 in	 the	means	of	our	outcome	variables	between	women	and	men,	net	of	other	differences.	In	a	final	step,	we	investigate	the	gender	composition	of	the	top	decile	of	the	joint	(women	and	men)	earnings	distribution.	It	is	important	to	note	that	parity	in	chances	to	be	part	of	the	top	decile	does	not	necessarily	correspond	to	gender	equality	to	the	degree	that	there	is	vertical	gender	segregation	within	the	top	group.	In	other	words,	women	may	still	earn	less	than	men	while	being	equally	represented	in	terms	of	numbers.	Nonetheless,	if	interpreted	as	a	minimum	condition,	it	can	be	a	straightforward	indicator	that	is	useful	to	observe	the	opposite,	namely	whether	or	to	what	degree	women	are	present	in	or	absent	from	the	top.			The	 variable	 education	 refers	 to	 the	 highest	 completed	 level	 of	 education	grouped	 in	 three	categories:		- less	 than	 secondary	 education	 completed	 (never	 attended,	 no	 completed	 education	 or	education	completed	at	the	ISCED	levels	0,	1	or	2)	- secondary	education	completed	(completed	ISCED	levels	3	or	4)	- tertiary	education	completed	(completed	ISCED	levels	5	or	6)	
Employment	status	(LIS	variable	emp)	is	a	dummy	variable	indicating	any	current	employment	activity	(employed/not	employed)	according	to	the	ILO	definition	of	employment.		
                                               5	Other	studies	have	used	“age	of	youngest	child”	instead.	However,	to	exploit	the	maximum	number	of	waves	and	countries,	we	have	opted	for	number	of	children.		6	Another	contribution	of	our	study	is	to	include	family	or	household	characteristics	into	the	wage	equations,	which	is	still	not	a	standard	procedure	in	the	economic	literature.		
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Household	characteristics	summarise	whether	the	respondent	is	living	with	a	partner	(yes/no)	as	well	as	the	number	of	children	present	in	the	household	(none/one/two	or	more).		Our	 occupational	 variable	 refers	 to	 the	 main	 job	 (occb1)	 and	 is	 based	 on	 the	 1-digit	 ISCO	classification.7	We	exclude	armed	forces	occupations.	To	avoid	empty	cells	in	the	Lexis	table,	we	collapsed	occupation	into	the	following	three	categories:	(1)	managers	and	professionals,	(2)	 technicians	 and	 associate	 professionals,	 clerical	 support	 workers,	 service	 and	 sales	workers,	skilled	agricultural,	forestry	and	fishery	workers,	craft	and	related	trades	workers,	as	well	as	plant	and	machine	operators,	and	assemblers,	and	(3)	elementary	occupations.			4.	 Results	
Our	results	confirm	the	gender-equalising	effect	of	educational	expansion	 in	most	countries,	where	 the	gender	gap	 in	 educational	 attainment	 today	 is	 closed	or	even	 reversed.	Figure	1	shows	the	difference	in	the	levels	of	attainment	of	tertiary	education	between	men	and	women	across	birth	cohorts	and	confirms	our	first	hypothesis.	More	specifically,	the	results	indicate	that	the	earliest	timing	of	the	rise	of	women	occurred	in	Denmark,	followed	by	Norway	and	the	US,	 where	 the	 gender	 gap	 in	 attainment	 of	 tertiary	 education	 had	 already	 diminished	 and	reversed	in	the	cohorts	born	after	1950	and	1960,	respectively.	Women	have	caught	up	but	not	(significantly)	 surpassed	 men	 in	 three	 of	 the	 twelve	 observed	 countries	 (Germany,	Luxembourg,	and	the	UK).	 	In	the	UK,	however,	women	and	men	have	historically	had	equal	levels	of	completed	tertiary	education.		FIGURE	1	ABOUT	HERE	This	 general	 inversion	 in	 the	 educational	 gap	may	 lead	 to	 a	 socioeconomic	 convergence	 of	women	and	men	–	to	the	extent	that	educational	equalities	are	the	underlying	reason	for	the	gender	earnings	gap.	Figure	2,	which	shows	the	uncontrolled	gender	difference	in	logit-ranked	total	earnings,	confirms	such	a	clear	general	cohort	trend	as	hypothesised	in	H2.	In	all	countries,	the	 gender	 earnings	 gap	 decreased	 considerably.	 However,	 against	 expectations,	 empirical	results	give	a	paradoxical	picture:	 the	gender	gap	 in	the	hierarchy	of	 total	earnings	 is	more	evident	than	the	gap	in	educational	attainment	and	the	convergence	between	women	and	men	in	 terms	 of	 earnings	 ranks	 is	 thus	 much	 weaker.	 In	 some	 countries,	 particularly	 in	 Spain,	Finland,	 France,	 and	 the	 US,	 the	 decreasing	 trend	 appears	 to	 be	 slowing	 down	 or	 even	
                                               7	Please	note	that	LIS	Waves	I-VII	recode	occupation	according	to	the	ISCO-88	standard	but	from	Wave	VIII	onwards	according	to	the	ISCO-08	standard.	
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stagnating	in	the	latest	cohorts.	Luxembourg	is	another	clear	and	interesting	case.	It	made	a	rapid	 transition	 from	 coal	 and	 steel	 industry	 towards	 a	 service	 economy,	 abolishing	 an	immense	 number	 of	well-paid	 jobs	 in	male-dominated	 occupations.	Due	 to	 late	 educational	expansion	and	low	female	labour	force	participation	rates	the	gender	earnings	gap	among	the	higher	educated	did	not	converge	 in	Luxembourg,	 in	contrast	with	the	stark	decrease	 in	 the	earnings	gap	among	the	lower	educated.	In	a	nutshell,	this	uncontrolled	gender	earnings	gap	reflects	 different	mechanisms	 that	 have	 changed	 over	 the	 cohorts,	 e.g.	 differences	 between	women	and	men	in	educational	attainment,	employment	status,	and	occupations	but	also	family	characteristics,	 preferences	 and	 (statistical)	 discrimination.	We	 therefore	 decompose	 these	differences	to	acquire	more	detailed	insights.	FIGURE	2	ABOUT	HERE	Moving	to	H3,	our	aim	was	to	identify	to	the	role	of	education	in	explaining	the	gender	earnings	gap.	 	To	this	end,	we	decomposed	the	gender	earnings	gap	in	two	steps:	first,	 including	only	
education	 (Figure	 3),	 second,	 including	 education	 as	well	 as	 employment	 status,	occupation,	household	characteristics	(presence	of	partner	and	number	of	children;	Figure	4	and	5).	Figure	3	 reveals	 how	 much	 of	 the	 mean	 differences	 across	 gender	 are	 accounted	 for	 by	 group	differences	in	education.	We	can	see	that,	with	the	exception	of	the	UK,	the	role	of	education	is	universally	declining	across	cohorts	confirming	our	hypothesis.	Moreover,	it	has	reversed	in	most	countries	as	the	negative	Oaxaca	coefficient	indicates.	This	implies	that	while	women	had	lower	earnings	and	inferior	levels	of	completed	education	than	men	in	earlier	cohorts,	women	in	more	 recent	 cohorts	are	better	educated	but	 still	have	 lower	earnings	 levels.	Given	 their	higher	education	than	men,	they	should	also	have	higher	earnings	today.		FIGURE	3	ABOUT	HERE	Decomposing	the	gender	earnings	gap	further,	Figure	4	shows	that	the	relative	importance	of	education	has	been	relatively	limited	over	the	cohorts.	We	moreover	observe	that	there	is	no	single	 common	 pattern.	 Countries	 differ	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 contribution	 of	 each	 factor.	Similarities,	 however,	 are	 that	 education	 and	 family	 characteristics	 (living	 with	 partner,	presence	of	children	in	the	household)	explain	little	of	the	total	gender	earnings	gap,	relative	to	other	factors.	Employment	status	on	the	other	hand	used	to	be	an	important	gender	difference	that	contributed	much	to	explaining	the	gender	earnings	gap	in	Germany,	Spain,	Israel,	Italy,	Luxembourg,	the	Netherlands	and	to	some	lesser	extent	in	France	and	Norway.	Except	for	Italy,	in	 all	 these	 countries	 the	 role	 of	 employment	 in	 explaining	 the	 gender	 earnings	 gap	 has	decreased	to	a	large	extent:	The	cohort	trends	confirm	the	trend	that	women	have	increasingly	
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joined	the	work	force	and	increased	thus	their	earnings	over	the	last	decades.	This	downward	trend	is	also	true	for	the	role	of	occupation	in	Germany,	Denmark,	Spain,	France,	Luxembourg	and	the	US.	Opposite	to	this	trend,	we	find	that	occupational	differences	increasingly	explain	the	gender	earnings	gap	in	a	few	countries	such	as	Finland,	Israel,	the	Netherlands	and	the	UK.	Put	 differently,	 occupational	 segregation	 by	 gender	 is	 more	 important	 than	 education	 in	explaining	the	gender	earnings	gap.		FIGURE	4	ABOUT	HERE	Figure	5	shows	the	total	gender	difference	in	earnings	and	how	much	of	it	remains	unexplained	by	the	comprehensive	set	of	individual	characteristics.	First,	important	differences	between	the	countries	 can	 be	 observed.	 In	 some	 countries,	 most	 notably	 Finland,	 much	 of	 the	 gender	earnings	gap	is	explained	by	the	covariates:	the	differences	between	women	and	men	are	due	to	differences	in	education,	family	patterns,	and	employment	status.	Finland	is	distinctive	from	other	Nordic	countries	for	its	very	high	rate	of	full-time	employment	among	employed	women	(Gornick	1999).	In	a	few	countries,	such	as	Germany	and	the	UK,	the	differences	in	the	above-mentioned	 characteristics	 including	 education	 still	 explain	 a	 relevant	 part	 of	 the	 gender	earnings	gap.	The	 total	differences	 indicate,	 second,	 that	 the	overall	 gender	earnings	gap	 is	shrinking	but	that	it	is	far	from	being	closed,	while	there	seems	to	be	a	persistent	unexplained	part,	except	in	the	UK,	even	with	control	variables	included.		FIGURE	5	ABOUT	HERE	How	can	these	diverging	levels	and	trends	across	countries	be	summarised?	Apparently	and	surprisingly,	these	patterns	do	not	follow	the	logic	of	welfare	states	or	gender	policy	regimes.	To	 facilitate	 the	 deduction	 of	 a	more	 general	 trend,	we	 compare	 the	 early	 and	 late	 cohorts	(Figure	6).	The	most	striking	result	 is	 that	 in	 terms	of	 the	explained	part	of	 the	gender	gap	countries	 converge	 towards	 a	 lower	 gender	 gap.	 While	 the	 differences	 in	 education,	employment,	occupation	and	household	characteristics	were	responsible	for	a	large	part	of	the	gender	earnings	gap	among	older	cohorts,	they	helped	to	considerably	shrink	the	total	gender	gap	 in	younger	 cohorts.	The	 countries	with	 the	biggest	 changes	are	Luxembourg,	Germany,	Spain	and	the	US	(right	panel	in	Figure	6).	Conversely,	the	development	of	the	unexplained	part	of	the	gender	gap	has	been	very	heterogeneous.	It	shrank	in	the	countries	below	the	diagonal	in	the	middle	panel	in	Figure	6,	e.g.	in	Germany,	the	UK	and	the	US,	but	rose	in	countries	above	the	diagonal	including	Italy,	France	and	the	Netherlands.	In	the	latter	group,	the	closing	gender	earnings	 gap	 induced	 by	 the	 “assimilation”	 of	 women	 and	 men	 in	 terms	 of	 education,	employment,	occupation	and	family	characteristics	was	partially	offset	by	other	factors.	In	the	
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Netherlands,	 where	 part-time	 employment	 plays	 an	 important	 role,	 differences	 in	 work	intensity	 between	 women	 and	 men	 could,	 for	 instance,	 be	 considered	 responsible	 for	 an	additional	part	of	the	unexplained	gender	earnings	gap.	Also	more	detailed	data	on	occupation	could	 better	 reflect	 the	 role	 of	 gender	 segregation.	 Country	 studies	 could	 investigate	 these	explanations	in	further	detail;	these	could	not	be	consistently	integrated	in	our	comparative	study.		Eventually,	our	results	do	not	reproduce	patterns	consistent	with	those	of	welfare	or	gender	policy	regimes.	For	 instance,	 Italy	and	Spain,	which	are	the	two	Southern	European	welfare	states	and	typical	male	breadwinner	cases,	in	our	analysis,	show	diverging	trends.	While	the	gender	gap	in	Italy	has	been	lower	among	older	cohorts,	which	remained	fairly	stable	over	time,	Spain	 has	 experienced	 a	 remarkable	 “modernisation”	 from	 a	 traditional	 gender-unequal	country	with	respect	to	the	gender	earnings	gap	catching	up	to	the	ranks	of	the	more	gender	equal	 countries	 today.	 Also	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 Conservative	 welfare	 states,	 we	 find	 large	disparities	in	the	trends.	Germany,	for	example,	is	rather	similar	today	in	terms	of	the	gender	earnings	gap,	but	has	been	been	(one	of)	the	most	gender	unequal	countries	in	our	analysis	in	the	past.	The	dual-earner/dual-carer	model,	representing	the	ideal	type	of	a	gender	egalitarian	society	 to	 which	 the	 Nordic	 countries	 come	 closest	 (Gornick	 and	 Meyers	 2009).	 Yet,	 also	consistent	with	other	studies,	we	find	deviating	trends	in	these	countries	(Sainsbury	1999).	In	contrast	 to	 the	rather	 low	but	stable	gender	gap	 in	Finland,	we	find	an	originally	higher	but	decreasing	gender	gap	in	Denmark	and	Norway.	Norway,	however,	is	the	only	Nordic	country	that	shows	an	increasing	unexplained	gender	gap,	similar	to	the	Netherlands,	a	formerly	male	breadwinner	 country	 that	 has	 moved	 towards	 a	 more	 gender-egalitarian	 direction.	 In	 a	nutshell,	 while	 we	 do	 not	 attempt	 here	 to	 provide	 a	 proper	 test	 of	 regime	 typologies,	 our	analysis	seems	to	point	to	the	conclusion	that	historical	configurations	and	their	legacies	and	their	diverging	impact	on	the	outcomes	of	different	cohorts	can	be	more	complex	than	these	typologies	suggest.		 FIGURE	6	ABOUT	HERE	Looking	next	at	two	groups	with	different	levels	of	educational	attainment,	we	hypothesised	in	H4	a	smaller	gender	earnings	gap	among	lower	educated	people	due	to	the	restructuring	of	the	labour	market.	To	this	end,	we	separate	our	analysis	by	level	of	educational	attainment	(Figure	7).	Indeed,	we	find	significant	differences	in	the	gender	earnings	gap	between	non-tertiary	and	
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tertiary	educated	 in	many	countries,	 at	 least	 in	 some	cohorts.8	 Systematically	 larger	gender	earnings	 gaps	 among	 the	 lower	 educated	 compared	 to	 higher	 educated	 are	 prevalent	 in	Denmark	and	the	US,	but	also	in	Finland,	Norway	and	Israel	among	older	cohorts.	Only	in	Spain	in	 the	1965-1970	cohort	 is	the	gender	earnings	gap	among	the	 lower	educated	significantly	higher	than	among	the	higher	educated.		As	to	the	trends,	the	shrinking	gender	earnings	gap	is	a	result	of	a	similar	development	in	both	educational	groups	in	Germany,	Denmark,	the	UK	and	the	US.	In	Finland,	Norway	and	to	a	lesser	extent	 in	 Israel,	 it	 is	 mainly	 the	 gender	 gap	 among	 the	 higher	 educated	 that	 caused	 the	narrowing	gender	gap	(while	 the	gender	gap	among	the	 lower	educated	 is	stable	or	slightly	increasing).	In	the	other	countries,	the	trends	are	much	less	clear.	Yet,	we	do	not	find	evidence	for	a	generally	 faster	 shrinking	gender	gap	among	 the	 low	skilled,	only	 in	 the	US.	Here,	 the	steady	disappearance	of	relatively	well-paid,	typically	male	occupied	unskilled	jobs	seems	to	haves	contributed	to	narrow	the	gender	earnings	gap.		FIGURE	7	ABOUT	HERE	As	 a	 final	 step,	 we	 investigated	 the	 gender	 composition	 of	 the	 top	 earnings	 decile.	 These	analyses	 enable	 us	 to	 observe	 cohort	 changes	 in	women’s	 representation	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	labour	market.	 Figure	 8	 presents	 these	 results.9	 All	 of	 the	 countries,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	Luxembourg	and	Finland,	experienced	a	significant	increase	in	the	chances	of	women	in	the	top	earnings	 decile.	 In	 Finland,	 the	 share	was	 relatively	 lower	 in	 earlier	 cohorts	 than	 in	 other	countries,	and	remained	stable	even	after	most	of	the	other	countries	achieved	similar	levels.	In	Luxembourg,	the	decline	was	not	significant,	likely	due	to	the	small	sample	size.		Younger	cohorts	experienced	a	slower	increase,	and	in	some	countries,	most	notably	the	US,	Spain,	Denmark	and	Israel,	cohorts	born	after	the	1960’s	did	not	experience	a	rise	at	all.	From	the	entire	sample,	only	Italy	demonstrated	a	linear	decline	in	men’s	share	of	the	top	earnings	decile,	which	seems	to	continue	even	for	the	last	cohorts.	Neither	of	the	countries	presented	a	reversed	 gender	 gap,	 i.e.	 overrepresentations	 of	 women	 in	 the	 top	 earnings	 decile.	 Most	importantly,	comparing	Figures	2	and	8,	we	find	very	similar	patterns	suggesting	that	women’s	chances	to	hold	top	positions	and	a	closing	gender	earnings	gap	are	closely	connected.	Yet,	most	importantly,	while	the	chances	of	women	to	be	in	the	top	earnings	group	increased	in	almost	every	country,	the	gender	earnings	gap	among	the	higher	educated	has	not	decreased	in	parallel	–	or	only	at	a	much	slower	pace.	
                                               8	Note	that	in	earlier	cohorts	with	only	few	women	with	tertiary	education	the	power	to	find	significant	results	is	restricted.	For	the	same	reason,	we	restrain	ourselves	from	interpreting	the	result	on	Italy	and	Luxembourg.	9	The	results	of	the	corresponding	analysis	for	the	top	vingtile	are	very	similar	to	the	ones	presented	here.		
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FIGURE	8	ABOUT	HERE		5.	 Conclusion	There	 is	much	 evidence	 that	 gender	 inequalities	 have	 eroded	 in	 the	 past	 in	many	 respects.	Regarding	 the	 future,	 scholars	 have	 outlined	 two	 diverging	 scenarios,	 an	 optimistic	 one,	 in	which	this	trend	continues	and	a	pessimistic	one,	where	gender	inequalities	persist	(Blau	et	al.	2008,	Blau	and	Kahn	2016).	The	present	study	on	the	gender	gap	in	education	and	earnings	in	twelve	countries	provides	evidence	for	both.	First,	we	noticed	significant	general	educational	shifts	in	most	of	the	twelve	developed	countries	towards	a	relative	improvement	for	women,	leading,	 in	most	 countries,	 to	 an	 inversion	 from	male	 to	 female	 domination	 in	 education	 in	recent	cohorts.	This	raises	hopes	for	a	concomitant	declining	explained	gender	earnings	gap.	However,	 this	 trend	 has	 not	 translated	 into	 a	 closing	 of	 the	 gender	 earnings	 gap.	 On	 the	contrary,	it	has	reached	and	stagnated	at	levels	far	from	economic	equalisation,	even	among	the	most	recent	cohorts.	With	respect	to	earnings,	there	is	thus	only	weak	evidence	for	a	declining	significance	of	gender.		Our	aim	also	was	to	identify	the	degree	to	which	education	and	-to	a	lesser	extent-	other	factors	contribute	to	explaining	the	gender	earnings	gap.	We	found	that	the	converging	profile	of	both	genders	leads	to	a	declining	gender	earnings	gap.	Furthermore,	we	have	shown	that	the	role	of	education	in	determining	the	gender	earnings	gap	has	been	relatively	small	relative	to	other	factors	and	that	it	has	decreased	further	across	cohorts.	More	specifically,	the	differences	and	changes	 in	 the	 employment	 status	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extend	 in	 occupation	 seem	 to	 be	 able	 to	explain	the	largest	part	of	(the	trends	in)	the	gender	earnings	gap.	Therefore,	the	decline	in	the	gender	 earnings	 gap	 slowed	 down	 among	 younger	 cohorts	 and	 for	 some	 countries,	 even	stopped	completely.	The	picture	is	similar	for	women’s	chances	of	holding	positions	in	the	top	earnings	tier.	In	sum,	there	are	important	results	as	they	contradict	the	wide	belief	that	the	rise	of	women	in	terms	of	education	could	lead	to	a	closing	of	the	gender	earnings	gap.		On	the	contrary,	 in	almost	all	countries,	a	 large	residual	of	unexplained	differences	persists.	This	also	implies	that	a	substantial	part	of	the	gender	earnings	gap	is	due	to	circumstances	we	were	not	able	take	into	consideration	here.	One	of	the	possible	explanations	may	be	that	new	forms	of	work	organisation	such	as	overwork	sustain	long-standing	gender	inequalities	despite	educational	 parity.	 Cha	 and	 Weeden	 (2014)	 show	 for	 the	 US	 that	 the	 effect	 of	disproportionately	long	working	hours	among	men	outweighs	the	earnings-equalising	effects	
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of	the	narrowing	gender	gap	in	educational	attainment.	Moreover,	women	seem	to	seek	jobs	with	greater	flexibility,	allowing	them	to	reconcile	family	responsibilities,	which	are,	however,	often	 less	well	paid	 (Goldin	2014).	 	 	 Future	 research	 could	 investigate	 such	questions	 for	a	smaller	set	of	countries,	with	more	detailed	harmonized	data.		Nevertheless,	 we	 were	 able	 to	 identify	 patterns	 in	 the	 diversity	 of	 country-specific	 cohort	trajectories	 and	 thus	 historical	 transformations.	We	 demonstrate	 that	welfare	 regimes	 can	influence	the	average	situation	of	a	country,	but	its	cohort	dynamics	do	not	follow	the	logics	of	welfare	states	or	gender	policy	regimes.	No	welfare	state	regime	experienced	a	homogeneous	trend.	 Specifically,	 we	 find	 a	 clearly	 converging	 trend	 towards	 more	 egalitarian	 outcomes,	which	is	mostly	due	to	the	decreasing	explained	gender	earnings	gap	in	formerly	highly	gender-inegalitarian	countries.	In	other	words,	the	generally	narrowing	gender	earnings	gap	is	due	to	the	decreasing	gender	gap	that	is	due	to	education,	employment	status,	occupation	and	family	characteristics.		On	the	contrary,	with	regards	to	the	trend	in	the	unexplained	part	of	the	gender	gap,	there	is	much	more	diversity	across	countries,	with	a	large	number	of	societies	stagnating	around	the	initial	 levels.	These	trends,	most	 importantly,	do	not	coincide	with	the	typologies	of	welfare	states	or	gender	 regimes	 leading	us	 to	 the	 conclusion	that	 complex	historical	 economic	and	political	configurations	of	countries	and	their	 legacies	 impact	distinctly	on	different	cohorts,	which	is	difficult	to	capture	by	comparative	typologies.	Evidently,	the	persistent	unexplained	gender	earnings	gap	points	towards	societal	or	cultural	differences,	social	norms	and	barriers	that	 past	 gender-equalising	 policy	 reforms	 as	 well	 as	 the	 more	 general	 transformation	 of	societies	have	not	been	able	to	stir,	not	even	in	the	Nordic	countries,	which	are	approaching	the	dual-earner/dual-carer	model.		Furthermore,	 we	 show	 that	 the	 pace	 of	 the	 narrowing	 gender	 earnings	 gap	 differs	 across	countries	 for	 the	 lower	and	higher	educated,	with	 lower	and/or	decreasing	 levels	of	gender	inequality	among	 low	educated	people.	Policies	matter	 for	women’s	outcomes	 (Mandel	 and	Shalev	 2009)	 but	 their	 effect	 has	 only	 rarely	 been	 investigated	 differentiating	 levels	 of	educational	attainment,	which	opens	another	interesting	direction	for	further	research.	Korpi,	Ferrarini	 and	 Englund	 (2013)	 have	 for	 instance	 shown	 that	 the	 effects	 of	 work-family	reconciliation	 and	 women’s	 employment	 policies	 on	women’s	 outcomes	 differ	 across	 their	levels	of	completed	education.		A	contribution	of	our	study	is	its	inclusion	of	women	not	in	full-time	employment;	i.e.,	those	who	work	part-time	or	have	no	employment.	Instead	of	focusing	on	hourly	earnings	or	other	
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measures	that	exclude	the	non-employed,	we	have	assessed	annual	earnings	and	also	included	women	with	 zero	earnings.	Our	measure	 is	moreover	more	 comprehensive	 than	 traditional	ones	as	 it	 comprises	not	only	with-in	 job	pay	differentials	but	also	differences	 in	 the	 initial	position	and	wage	as	well	as	over	the	career,	promotions,	the	glass	ceiling,	and	departures	or	labour	market	exits	(cf.	Petersen	and	Saporta	2004).	This	represents,	in	our	view,	a	wider,	more	realistic	gender	earnings	gap	better	reflecting	women’s	relative	position	and	power	in	today’s	societies.			Finally,	our	study	contributes	to	understanding	the	timing	of	the	reduction	of	the	gender	gap	in	earnings:	it	has	been	strong	and	fast	in	Germany,	Luxembourg,	and	the	US;	it	has	been	slower	in	France	and	the	UK.	In	countries	where	the	gaps	were	smaller	for	the	1940	birth	cohort,	the	convergence	is	much	slower	with	some	stagnation.	The	importance	of	comparative	birth	cohort	analysis	can	therefore	not	be	overstated.	The	gendered	trends	in	educational	attainment	that	are	central	factors	in	the	dynamics	of	stratification	are	diverse	as	are	their	real	impact.	Thus,	comparative	 research	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 vital	 for	 the	 stabilization	 of	 results	 on	 social	stratification.	Our	central	conclusion	is	that	educational	and	earnings	inequality	in	labour	market	outcomes	are	 two	 relatively	 independent	 dimensions	 of	 gender	 inequality,	 and	 the	 reduction	 of	educational	gaps	may	be	a	necessary	condition	of	economic	equality,	but	it	is	not	sufficient.	In	many	countries,	educational	equality	has	been	reached	or	even	exceeded	(with	women	having	a	better	education),	but	the	economic	gap	as	well	as	the	gap	in	chances	to	hold	top	positions	remain	large,	visible,	and	durable,	even	for	the	very	latest	cohorts	of	young	adults	and,	thus,	for	the	future.	We	observe	in	several	countries	including	the	Netherlands	as	well	as	the	South	and	the	North	of	Europe	a	persistence	of	the	“unexplained”	part	of	the	gender	earnings	gap,	often	presented	 as	 “pure	 discrimination”	 (Oaxaca	 and	 Ransom,	 1988).	 This	 large,	 stagnant	unexplained	 residue	 after	 taking	 into	 account	 observable	 differences	 implies	 that	 “other	factors”	(values,	norms,	etc.)	generate	pertinacious	gender	gaps.	In	those	countries,	over	the	last	decades,	time	alone	brought	no	reduction	of	this	“pure”	inequality.			
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Supplementary	material	S1:		The	APCD	model	as	basis	of	the	APC-GO	
The	 second	 step	 relies	 on	 an	 adaptation	 called	 the	 APCL	 (lag)	 of	 our	 former	 APCD	 (detrended)	model	(Chauvel	2013;	Chauvel	et	al.	2016).	The	APCD	delivers	a	trend	zero	vector	of	cohort	fluctuations.	The	APCD	is	modified	here	to	deliver	a	 	vector	of	 intensity	and	trend	 in	gap.	Based	the	pioneering	works	(Ryder	1965,	Mason	et	al.	1973,	Glenn	1976),	important	improvements	of	APC	models	were	made	in	the	last	decade	(Nielson	2015).	Albeit	some	aspects	are	still	debated	(Luo	et	al.	2016),	two	aspects	of	the	APC	debate	have	clearly	stabilized	today.	The	first	one	is	the	identification	of	fluctuation:	it	is	now	clear	that	cohort	fluctuations	(i.e.,	the	degree	to	which	some	cohorts	did/do	better	than	others	after	controlling	for	linear	effects	of	age	period	 and	 cohort)	 are	 (easily)	 identifiable	 with	 simple	 tools.	 This	 is	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 APCD	model10	(Chauvel	2013;	Chauvel	and	Schröder	2014;	Chauvel	et	al.	2016),	otherwise	called	ZLT	(zero	linear	trend),	a	recent	reformulation	of	the	Holford	model	(1980).	From	a	Lexis	table	where	yapc	is	a	dependent	variable	that	pertains	to	an	individual	i	of	age	a	in	period	p,	and	thus	of	cohort	membership	c,	where	c=p-a,	APCD,	one	can	extract:		- a	single	constant	 	- a	single	two-dimensional	linear	(=hyperplane)	trend	that	can	be	arbitrarily	associated	with	age	and	period,	age	and	cohort	or	period	and	cohort,	but	no	decomposition	can	be	directly	 interpreted	as	causally	relevant	[this	is	the	term	 	]	- three	vectors	(age,	period	and	cohort	 )	of	fluctuations	defined	by	zero	sum	and	zero	trend		𝑦"#$ = 𝛼" + 𝜋# + 𝛾$ + 𝛼*𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑎) + 𝛾*𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒(𝑐) + 𝛽* + 𝜀	 	 (APCD)	𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑠	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠	𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ	𝑠𝑒𝑡	𝑜𝑓	𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠		𝛼",𝜋#, 𝛾$	𝑎𝑟𝑒	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑	𝑡𝑜	𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜;		𝛼*𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝛾*𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑏	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑	𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦		As	such,	the	APCD	is	not	able	to	produce	the	solution	needed,	since	the	cohort	vector	expresses	accelerations	and	decelerations	of	gender	gaps	once	the	general	trend	is	suppressed.	Therefore,	we	consider	an	extension	by	constraining	the	model.		This	involves	the	second	aspect	of	the	APC	debate,	which	pertains	to	the	identification	of	trends	and	is	thus	more	complex.	Due	to	the	collinear	relation	a=p-c,	the	decomposition	of	age,	period	and	cohort	linear	effects	(the	 above-mentioned	 hyperplane)	 has	 no	 general	 solution	 without	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 constraint	(Glenn	 1976).	 Once	 it	 is	 done,	 this	 arbitrary	 choice	 leads	 to	 a	 unique	 APC	 trend	 decomposition.	 Some	conventional	1980s	APC	models	proposed	to	equate	the	first	and	the	last	coefficients	of	a	cohort,	or	to	keep	the	period	trend	as	zero,	for	instance.	Once	a	constraint	is	implemented,	the	model	is	identified;	however,	it	is	impossible	(or	difficult)	to	propose	a	general	non	ad	hoc	justification	of	this	choice.	Strategies	which	are	supposed	to	make	no	arbitrary	choice	in	the	constraints	–	for	example	the	APC-IE	intrinsic	estimator	(Yang	
                                               10	The	APCD	can	be	downloaded	as	a	Stata	ado-file	by	typing	“ssc	install	apcd”	in	Stata.	
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et	al.	2008)	or	the	Hierarchic	HAPC	(Zheng	et	al.	2011)	–	actually	hide	such	implicit	arbitrary	constraints.	For	instance,	APC-IE	is	based	on	a	principal	component	analysis	to	reduce	the	three	dimensional	indices	a	p	c	on	a	geometrically	optimal	two	dimensional	hyperplane;	for	multilevel	strategies	such	as	HAPC,	random	effects	on	period	and	cohort	effects	hide	an	 implicit	detrending	of	period	and	cohort	(e.g.,	Bell	and	Jones	2017).		These	methods	are	even	more	problematic	when	dealing	with	the	effect	of	education	over	age	period	and	cohort.	Due	to	their	general	 inaptitude	to	relevantly	decompose	trends,	 they	 inadequately	decompose	the	age	effect	of	education	as	a	strong,	steady	decline	in	education	across	life	span	–	as	seniors	are	always	older	than	juniors.	This	is	obviously	misleading,	if	not	absurd.11			
References	Bell,	A.	and	K.	 Jones.	2017.	The	hierarchical	age–period–cohort	model:	Why	does	it	find	the	results	that	it	finds?	Quality	&	Quantity:	1-17.	Chauvel,	L.	2013.	Welfare	Regimes,	Cohorts	and	the	Middle	Classes.	In	Gornick,	J.C.,	Jäntti,	Markus	(eds.)	Income	Inequality:	Economic	Disparities	and	the	Middle	Class	in	Affluent	Countries.	Stanford	University	Press:	115-141.	Chauvel,	L.	2016.	The	Intensity	and	Shape	of	Inequality:	The	ABG	Method	of	Distributional	Analysis.	Review	of	Income	and	Wealth:	62:	52–68.	doi:10.1111/roiw.12161	Chauvel,	L.,	A.	Hartung	&	E.	Bar-Haim,	2017.	APCGO:	Stata	module	to	calculate	age-period-cohort	effects	for	the	gap	between	two	 groups	 (based	 on	 a	 Blinder-Oaxaca	 decomposition),	 including	 trends	 for	 each	 parameter.	 Statistical	 Software	Components	 S458331,	 Boston	 College	 Department	 of	 Economics,	 revised	 25	 Apr	 2017.	https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s458331.html	Chauvel,	L.,	A.K.	Leist,	and	V.	Ponomarenko.	2016.	Testing	persistence	of	cohort	effects	in	the	epidemiology	of	suicide:	An	age-period-cohort	hysteresis	model.	PLOS	ONE.	Glenn,	N.D.	1989.	A	caution	about	mechanical	solutions	to	the	identification	problem	in	cohort	analysis:	Comment	on	Sasaki	and	Suzuki.	American	Journal	of	Sociology,	95:754-761.	Holford,	T.R.	1980.	The	analysis	of	rates	and	of	survivorship	using	log-linear	models.	Biometrics,	299-305.	Luo	L.,	 J.	Hodges,	C.	Winship,	 et	 al.	 2016.	The	 sensitivity	of	 the	 intrinsic	estimator	 to	 coding	 schemes:	Comment	on	Yang,	Schulhofer-Wohl,	Fu,	and	Land.	American	Journal	of	Sociology,	122:	930-961.	Mason,	K.O.,	W.M.	Mason,	H.H.	Winsborough,	and	W.K.	Poole.	1973.	Some	methodological	issues	in	cohort	analysis	of	archival	data.	American	Sociological	Review,	38(2):242-258.	Nielsen,	B.	2015.	apc:	An	R	package	for	age-period-cohort	analysis.	R	Journal,	7(2).	Ryder,	N.B.	1965.	The	cohort	as	a	concept	in	the	study	of	social	change.	American	Sociological	Review,	30(6):84-861.	Yang,	Y.,	S.	Schulhofer-Wohl,	W.J.	Fu,	and	K.C.	Land.	2008.	The	intrinsic	estimator	for	age-period-cohort	analysis:	What	it	is	and	how	to	use	it.	American	Journal	of	Sociology,	113(6):1697-1736.	Zheng,	H.,	Y.	Yang,	and	K.C.	Land.	2011.	Variance	function	regression	in	hierarchical	age-period-cohort	models:	Applications	to	the	study	of	self-reported	health.	Am	Sociol	Rev,	76(6):	955-983.	
                                               
11 See	annexes	and	replication	files	of	‘Problems	with	APC-IE	and	HAPC’	in	the	online	version	of	the	study	by	Chauvel	and	Schröder	(2015). 







Cohort 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
DE (log)Income 10.75 10.86 10.84 10.78 10.75 10.77 10.7 10.58 10.32 10.32 
 S.D. (0.51) (0.54) (0.58) (0.62) (0.6) (0.56) (0.56) (0.57) (0.61) (0.68) 
 Number of Children 1.15 1.1 1.12 1.15 1.27 1.28 1.14 0.98 0.62 0.34 
 S.D. (01.02) (01.06) (01.04) (01.05) (01.03) (01.05) (01.03) (01.) (0.88) (0.71) 
DK (log)Income 12.32 12.46 12.58 12.66 12.67 12.67 12.63 12.64 12.61 12.55 
 S.D. (0.51) (0.52) (0.52) (0.54) (0.57) (0.56) (0.58) (0.58) (0.63) (0.67) 
 Number of Children 0.34 0.45 0.59 0.81 1.13 1.33 1.22 1.06 0.8 0.44 
 S.D. (0.65) (0.74) (0.85) (0.96) (01.03) (01.05) (01.06) (01.05) (0.97) (0.74) 
ES (log)Income 14.31 14.45 13.35 12.8 12.66 12.4 11.6 11.02 10.09 10.16 
 S.D. (0.78) (0.78) (02.08) (02.28) (02.29) (02.41) (02.44) (02.13) (0.72) (0.76) 
 Number of Children 1.79 1.98 1.81 1.57 1.47 1.42 1.27 1.02 0.63 0.21 
 S.D. (01.03) (0.97) (01.) (0.98) (0.92) (0.91) (0.96) (0.93) (0.84) (0.54) 
FI (log)Income 11.87 11.98 11.7 11.54 11.52 11.48 11.31 11.03 10.45 10.43 
 S.D. (0.51) (0.52) (0.81) (0.84) (0.81) (0.8) (0.81) (0.81) (0.57) (0.59) 
 Number of Children 0.93 1.11 1.18 1.25 1.37 1.45 1.42 1.21 0.89 0.56 
 S.D. (0.97) (01.03) (01.05) (01.07) (01.09) (01.11) (01.11) (01.11) (01.02) (0.87) 
FR (log)Income 11.76 11.92 11.69 11.41 11.37 11.23 10.99 10.72 10.19 10.09 
 S.D. (0.67) (0.64) (0.88) (01.01) (0.97) (01.03) (01.03) (01.03) (0.82) (0.96) 
 Number of Children 0.99 1.14 1.26 1.3 1.41 1.48 1.46 1.34 1.1 0.75 
 S.D. (01.04) (01.07) (01.07) (01.07) (01.06) (01.05) (01.07) (01.09) (01.08) (01.01) 
IL (log)Income 10.65 10.95 11.13 11.2 11.16 11.44 11.57 11.66 11.66 11.73 
 S.D. (0.85) (0.91) (0.94) (0.99) (01.03) (0.77) (0.69) (0.65) (0.67) (0.74) 
 Number of Children 1.89 2.04 2.02 2.05 2.1 2.16 2.07 1.97 1.86 1.85 
 S.D. (01.12) (01.07) (01.08) (01.05) (01.) (0.98) (01.03) (01.05) (01.11) (01.15) 
IT (log)Income 17.2 17.31 16.04 15.04 15.02 14.7 14.02 13.07 10.14 10.2 
 S.D. (0.68) (0.68) (02.84) (03.37) (03.33) (03.58) (03.76) (03.79) (0.73) (0.81) 
 Number of Children 1.5 1.55 1.53 1.47 1.42 1.39 1.24 1.11 0.78 0.65 
 S.D. (0.98) (0.96) (0.94) (0.95) (0.93) (0.94) (0.98) (0.98) (0.89) (0.81) 
LU (log)Income 14.05 14.2 13.21 12.53 12.53 12.55 12.27 11.78 10.91 11.01 
 S.D. (0.52) (0.54) (01.62) (01.66) (01.66) (01.71) (01.73) (01.57) (0.54) (0.55) 
 Number of Children 1.21 1.22 1.16 1.14 1.27 1.4 1.37 1.23 1.01 0.54 
 S.D. (01.03) (01.04) (01.01) (01.01) (01.01) (01.06) (01.06) (01.06) (01.02) (0.84) 
NL (log)Income 10.65 10.81 10.68 10.68 10.69 10.72 10.66 10.6 10.45 10.46 
 S.D. (0.6) (0.56) (0.59) (0.56) (0.53) (0.52) (0.51) (0.49) (0.44) (0.48) 
 Number of Children 1.04 1.13 1.08 1.09 1.32 1.48 1.45 1.31 1.01 0.85 
 S.D. (01.08) (01.08) (01.06) (01.06) (01.07) (01.07) (01.08) (01.05) (01.03) (01.) 
NO (log)Income 12.57 12.69 12.79 13.09 13.14 13.18 13.19 13.18 13.09 12.88 
 S.D. (0.5) (0.55) (0.54) (0.66) (0.7) (0.69) (0.67) (0.65) (0.71) (0.84) 
 Number of Children 1.1 1.1 1.17 0.65 1. 1.36 1.57 1.5 1.07 0.53 
 S.D. (01.02) (01.05) (01.07) (0.92) (01.01) (01.05) (01.06) (01.08) (01.03) (0.81) 
UK (log)Income 9.47 9.65 9.82 9.91 9.93 9.99 9.99 10.11 10.19 10.23 
 S.D. (0.73) (0.74) (0.76) (0.76) (0.77) (0.71) (0.7) (0.67) (0.6) (0.6) 
 Number of Children 0.59 0.73 0.85 1.03 1.27 1.38 1.3 1.17 0.98 0.65 
 S.D. (0.86) (0.93) (0.99) (01.05) (01.07) (01.07) (01.08) (01.07) (01.04) (0.92) 
US (log)Income 10.3 10.41 10.49 10.54 10.55 10.63 10.69 10.72 10.72 10.74 
 S.D. (0.81) (0.79) (0.82) (0.84) (0.83) (0.8) (0.78) (0.74) (0.75) (0.75) 
 Number of Children 0.85 0.98 1.08 1.15 1.26 1.32 1.35 1.29 1.12 0.81 
 S.D. (01.) (01.05) (01.07) (01.08) (01.09) (01.11) (01.11) (01.12) (01.1) (01.01) Source:	LIS.	
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Table	A2:	Descriptive	statistics:	Proportion	of	the	Dichotomous	Variables	in	the	Sample	by	
Cohort	and	Country	
1985 1980 1975 1970 1965 1960 1955 1950 1945 1940 1935 Variable/Cohort Country 
0.57 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.49 Female DE 
0.86 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.68 Employed  
0.52 0.61 0.71 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.85 Partner  
0.34 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.11 Tertiary education  
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 Female DK 
0.71 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.80 0.76 0.69 0.76 Employed  
0.52 0.61 0.66 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.78 Partner  
0.35 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.16 Tertiary education  
0.50 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.46 Female ES 
0.59 0.75 0.74 0.70 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.49 Employed  
0.25 0.45 0.63 0.69 0.66 0.75 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.85 Partner  
0.39 0.40 0.38 0.32 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.06 Tertiary education  
0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49 Female FI 
0.68 0.70 0.75 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.80 0.74 Employed  
0.72 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.82 Partner  
0.37 0.33 0.27 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.11 Tertiary education  
0.57 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 Female FR 
0.62 0.74 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.78 0.73 0.68 0.65 Employed  
0.56 0.69 0.73 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 Partner  
0.35 0.40 0.37 0.28 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.04 Tertiary education  
0.51 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.51 Female IL 
0.70 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.70 0.66 0.63 Employed  
0.47 0.61 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.88 Partner  
0.39 0.47 0.48 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.24 0.20 Tertiary education  
0.49 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 Female IT 
0.54 0.66 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.63 0.58 0.54 0.50 Employed  
0.19 0.28 0.40 0.55 0.65 0.73 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.86 Partner  
0.26 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.08 Tertiary education  
0.52 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.48 0.53 0.54 0.49 Female LU 
0.79 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.80 0.74 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.50 0.43 Employed  
0.50 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.83 0.85 Partner  
0.30 0.31 0.31 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.03 Tertiary education  
0.52 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53 Female NL 
0.85 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.78 0.74 0.66 0.62 0.50 0.42 Employed  
0.61 0.77 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.86 Partner  
0.45 0.43 0.41 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.14 0.11 Tertiary education  
0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.48 Female NO 
0.73 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.77 0.83 0.83 0.80 0.74 Employed  
0.48 0.66 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.85 Partner  
0.42 0.45 0.42 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.14 Tertiary education  
0.55 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.50 Female UK 
0.76 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.70 0.64 0.70 Employed  
0.58 0.66 0.68 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.79 0.81 Partner  
0.44 0.43 0.33 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.07 Tertiary education  
0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.51 Female US 
0.72 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.73 0.69 Employed  
0.55 0.65 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.76 Partner  
0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.32 0.27 0.23 Tertiary education  Source:	LIS.			 	
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Table	A3:	Descriptive	statistics:	Proportion	of	the	Occupational	Categories	in	the	Sample	by	
Cohort	and	Country	
Country Occupation/Cohort  1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
DE Managers 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.24 
 Professionals 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.49 
 Others  0.47 0.40 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.28 
DK Managers 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.20 
 Professionals 0.45 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.31 0.44 0.39 
 Others  0.36 0.83 0.90 0.77 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.55 0.37 0.41 
ES Managers 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 
 Professionals 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.49 0.51 0.40 
 Others  0.58 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.36 0.36 0.48 
FI Managers 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.22 0.20 
 Professionals 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.44 
 Others  0.35 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.36 
FR Managers 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.13 
 Professionals 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.53 0.52 0.45 
 Others  0.43 0.39 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.42 
IL Managers 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.11 
 Professionals 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53 
 Others  0.40 0.38 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.36 
LU Managers 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.17 
 Professionals 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.37 0.34 0.44 0.52 0.51 0.53 
 Others  0.75 0.80 0.75 0.66 0.61 0.49 0.52 0.39 0.27 0.27 0.30 
NL Managers 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.29 
 Professionals 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.31 0.33 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.54 0.52 
 Others  0.86 0.73 0.71 0.61 0.49 0.45 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.15 0.19 
UK Managers 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.18 
 Professionals 0.46 0.40 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.48 
 Others  0.35 0.43 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.34 
US Managers 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.20 
 Professionals 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 
 Others  0.37 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.33 Source:	LIS.	
 
 			
